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ESSAY 
THE BANKRUPTCY FIRM 
VINCENT S.J. BUCCOLA† 
INTRODUCTION 
Bankruptcy scholars spend too much time thinking about distributional 
norms and not enough assessing the impact of bankruptcy rules on the quality of 
governance in Chapter 11. That, in short, is the thesis of The Bankruptcy Partition, 
the contribution of Professors Baird, Casey, and Picker to this symposium.1 Of 
course, the authors being who they are, the Article is about much, much more. 
This brief response seeks to draw out some of the article’s themes and, in the last 
Part, to suggest an approach to thinking about the nature of the bankrupt firm 
that could deepen and extend a conversation the authors usefully begin. 
I. THE ROLE OF THE FIRM IN BANKRUPTCY 
The Bankruptcy Partition flows from a simple premise—that reorganization law 
seeks (or in any case should seek) to maximize the value of the bankrupt firm.2 It 
sounds like a consensus statement of purpose, but in fact it is not so obvious. This 
is because firm-value maximization is posited in contrast to another plausible 
norm with which it is often (mistakenly) elided—that of investor-wealth 
maximization. In a frictionless world, these two norms have identical content. 
But in the real world, as the authors point out, maximizing firm value often 
means not maximizing investor wealth.3 More specifically, a focus on firm value 
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1 Douglas G. Baird, Anthony J. Casey & Randal C. Picker, The Bankruptcy Partition, 166 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1675 (2018). It is also the point of departure of Professor Rasmussen’s contribution. See generally 
Robert K. Rasmussen, Taking Control Rights Seriously, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1749 (2018). 
2 Baird, Casey & Picker, supra note 1, at 1679. 
3 Id. at 1682. (“The focus, however, is upon maximizing the value of the estate, not on the total return 
to creditors as a group.”); Id. at 1683 (“The proper focus is entirely on what goes to creditors on account of 
their claims against the estate.”). 
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implies that bankruptcy decision processes should, insofar as possible, ignore the 
effects of firm activity on the value of investors’ “outside” investments.4 
To illustrate the contrast between the competing norms, suppose a debtor is 
looking to sell a factory under § 363.5 Two potential buyers emerge. One is an 
existing creditor of the debtor; the other, a stranger. And suppose further that the 
creditor–-bidder will benefit immensely by acquiring the factory, but, because of 
liquidity constraints, can afford to pay slightly less than the stranger can. If the 
aim of bankruptcy were to maximize investor wealth, then this creditor-bidder’s 
plight would matter to the decision calculus. It might make sense to channel the 
assets his way, even though doing so would promise to reduce other investors’ 
recoveries, because his gains could exceed the sum of the others’ losses. Not so 
under a firm-value maximization norm. Where firm value is the aim, top dollar 
for the seller is all that counts. 
As this example suggests, to assert the firm-value norm is to advocate a 
conflict resolution process destined to allocate resources inefficiently (viewed ex 
post). If firm-value maximization is desirable, it is due to the norm’s offsetting, 
salutary effects on ex ante investment decisionmaking. Among other things, a 
focus on firm value, like the rule of limited liability, helps to make investment 
interests fungible and so opens up secondary markets. And so one’s investment 
in a firm typically carries with it the implicit agreement that one’s private 
interests other than those embodied in the investment contract itself will be 
excluded from management’s decision calculus.6 The logic has been central to the 
literature on asset partitioning for decades.7 If its implications are striking in this 
 
4 I’ll return in Part III to the question of what, in the article’s scheme, distinguishes an asset of the 
firm from an asset held outside the firm. For now, think of outside assets as the set of investors’ legal rights 
other than those that are obligations of the debtor. Because by accounting, identity assets equal liabilities 
plus equity, saying that bankruptcy should maximize the value of a firm’s assets is equivalent to saying 
bankruptcy should maximize the total returns on all of the firm’s securities and other legal obligations. The 
size of returns on other investments—which is to say, investors’ outside assets—is irrelevant under this 
scheme. Thus, unless the value of “outside” assets is positively related to the value of firm assets in a 
particular case, outcomes under a firm-value and an investor-wealth rule of decision will diverge. 
5 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2012) (authorizing, with judicial consent, the use or sale of debtor 
property outside the ordinary course of business). 
6 In her contribution to this symposium, Professor Jacoby calls attention to another defect of the 
investor-wealth maximization norm—namely, its tendency in practice, if not theory, to disregard the 
interests of constituents with relatively little voice. Melissa B. Jacoby, Corporate Bankruptcy Hybridity, 166 
U. PA. L. REV. 1715,1730-31 (2018). 
7 See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & Henry Hansmann, Legal Entities as Transferable Bundles of Contracts, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 715, 748 (2013); Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. Casey, No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the 
Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2013); Anthony J. Casey, The New Corporate 
Web: Tailored Entity Partitions and Creditors’ Selective Enforcement, 124 YALE L.J. 2680, 2683-84 (2015); Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000); 
Edward M. Iacobucci & George G. Triantis, Economic and Legal Boundaries of Firms, 93 VA. L. REV. 515, 
517-18 (2007); George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of Firms, 
Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1104 (2004). 
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context, it is only because bankruptcy scholarship and case law have seldom taken 
seriously the distinction between a firm’s value and the aggregate creditor 
recovery its reorganization produces.8 The Bankruptcy Partition does a valuable 
service in bringing this distinction to the surface. 
In any case, the firm-value maximization norm does a lot of work in the 
article. One thing it does is to analytically decompose the creditors’ bargain. 
Bankruptcy law, under the authors’ approach, is implicitly modeled as having 
three distinctive functions: first, to define a “firm”; second, to charge the 
bankruptcy court with the task of maximizing the value of that firm, and to give 
it the tools necessary to do so; and third, to distribute claims on the reorganized 
firm. The authors set aside this third step—distribution—and focus on the first 
two functions, to which I will now turn, in reverse order. 
II. INFORMATION PRODUCTION 
A major aim of The Bankruptcy Partition is to persuade readers that the 
imperative to maximize firm value animates much of what is most interesting 
in reorganization law today. The article thus seeks to reorient debate about 
controversial practices, away from questions of cash flow rights (or distribution) 
and toward the design of control and influence rights. And the article makes a 
strong case that a number of features of reorganization practice are best judged 
by their capacity to produce reliable information about the effect of a proposed 
action on firm value rather than investor wealth—what the authors call 
“policing” the partition. 
The intuition is developed mainly with examples. Thus, for instance, 
critical vendor orders and roll-ups are assessed according to their expected 
effect on firm value rather than their aberrant tendency to violate distributional 
norms.9 The article’s practical conclusions on these topics are not inconsistent 
with leading authorities, such as In re Kmart.10 To the extent paying a 
prepetition claim in full is likely to increase the debtor’s value, doing so is 
presumptively proper.11 But the article’s approach helps to explain where and 
why bankruptcy judges should be skeptical about payments to some prepetition 
creditors more than others. 
 
8 For a more general evaluation of the tradeoff between ex ante and ex post efficiency in 
bankruptcy, see David A. Skeel, Jr. & George Triantis, Bankruptcy’s Uneasy Shift to a Contract Paradigm, 
166 U. PA. L. REV. 1777 (2018). 
9 Baird, Casey & Picker, supra note 1, at 1705-14. 
10 In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004). 
11 A puzzle The Bankruptcy Partition exposes but which it does not seek to resolve is why debtors in 
possession should have flexibility to pay prepetition creditors during the pendency of a bankruptcy but not 
through a plan of reorganization. More generally, why might a bankruptcy judge’s application of discretion 
be expected to maximize firm value in the early days of bankruptcy but not at its end? For a speculative 
explanation, see Vincent S.J. Buccola, The Janus Faces of Reorganization Law, 44 J. CORP. L. 1, 27-28 (2018). 
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To maximize firm value, the bankruptcy judge needs tools to harness 
investors’ private information and check their self-interest. A number of 
discretionary powers are explained instrumentally along these lines. To take just 
one of the authors’ examples, consider the power to designate votes cast in bad 
faith. There is general agreement that it is proper to designate the vote of a 
creditor holding a large short interest—to prevent the creditor from willfully 
tanking the debtor.12 Without recourse to the firm-value maximization objective, 
however, this intuition and the designation power itself are hard to square with 
ordinary norms of commercial self-interest. 
By focusing on this idea—that a judge’s goal is to maximize firm value and not 
creditors’ total returns—The Bankruptcy Partition helps to explain and unify what 
otherwise might seem to be puzzling or unrelated features of reorganization law. 
The judge wants to maximize the value of the firm, but the investors, who exert 
influence over the ultimate disposition of the estate’s assets, each seek to maximize 
their respective private returns. The imperfect correlation between firm value and 
investors’ total returns causes problems. Of course, we have long understood that 
conflict in bankruptcy naturally results from the hierarchical nature of investors’ 
claims. Neither the fully secured senior lender nor the underwater junior interest 
wants strictly to maximize firm value, and bankruptcy supplies a means to 
adjudicate their disagreement. A significant contribution of the article is to 
highlight the ways bankruptcy law must also, and for the same reason, take account 
of creditor interests altogether outside the bankruptcy. The more likely it is that 
the value of an investor’s outside investments are inversely related to the value of 
the bankrupt firm, the more skeptically the judge must view that investor’s 
influence over the debtor in possession and, eventually, plan confirmation. 
III. DEFINING THE FIRM IN BANKRUPTCY 
Let me turn now to the antecedent issue I have so far bracketed: what exactly 
is this firm (or what should it be) whose value the bankruptcy process is meant 
to maximize?13 The article answers this question—what defines the firm in 
bankruptcy?—by introducing a new analytical construct: the bankruptcy 
partition. The authors do not explicitly define the partition, so I will take the 
liberty of interpretation. The bankruptcy partition describes a pool of assets over 
which the trustee and bankruptcy judge have, or may assert, control rights. This 
 
12 Baird, Casey & Picker, supra note 1, at 1695-96. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2012) (“On request of 
a party in interest, and after notice and a hearing, the court may designate any entity whose acceptance or 
rejection of such plan was not in good faith, or was not solicited or procured in good faith or in accordance 
with the provisions of this title.”). 
13 Note that this question arises only under the firm-value maximization norm and not under the 
investor-wealth maximization norm. That is, we care what counts as “the firm” only if the boundary itself 
supplies reasons for acting in certain ways, which it does not do under a general wealth-maximization norm. 
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pool of assets is closely related to, but not identical with and systematically 
greater than, the assets that would belong to the debtor firm outside bankruptcy 
in a counterfactual world where no petition for relief was filed. For the authors, 
it is this broader, bankruptcy-specific set of assets whose joint value 
reorganization law should seek to maximize. 
Inside the partition lies, first, the entirety of the statutorily defined 
“estate”—roughly speaking, all of the inventory, equipment, leases, contracts, 
and so on, that the debtor held before bankruptcy—and, second, all property 
held by others but subject to the trustee’s avoidance powers.14 So far, so good. 
Think what one will about the avoidance powers as a normative matter; at least 
one can agree that under existing law they in fact bring assets within the control 
of the trustee and court. 
Additional items that lie inside the partition warrant further discussion.15 Some 
of these additional items are brought within the bankruptcy partition as a matter 
of course in every case. The security interest is a prime example.16 Under ordinary 
principles of commercial law, the security interest allows a lender to foreclose on 
collateral upon the debtor’s default. A major function of the automatic stay, 
however, is to divest secured lenders of this very right.17 The stay can thus be recast 
as a transfer of state-contingent control rights over the collateral from the lender to 
the trustee. In the article’s idiom, bankruptcy sweeps the security interest inside 
the partition. To be sure, the law protects the lender’s distributional interest by 
requiring that she be adequately protected during the bankruptcy and that she 
receive the “indubitable equivalent” of her secured claim under a plan of 
reorganization.18 But the law also invests the trustee and the court with control of 
the foreclosure right, and consequently it is within the pool of assets whose value 
bankruptcy ought, in the authors’ view, to maximize.19 
 
14 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012) (describing the estate); Id. §§ 544–45, 547–49 (enumerating 
the trustee’s avoidance powers). 
15 The authors distinguish municipal bankruptcy, saying that deviations from joint-value 
maximization there are more acceptable, on the ground that Chapter 9 does not create an estate. Baird, 
Casey & Picker, supra note 1, at 1713. It is an accurate description of the law, but the existence of a statutory 
estate is neither here nor there under the article’s schema. What matters for the schema is the authors’ 
analytical construct, the partition, and not the “estate” with which bankruptcy lawyers are familiar. The 
better explanation of the uneven distributions in Detroit’s bankruptcy, to which the authors refer, is 
Chapter 9’s “legislative” character. See generally Vincent S.J. Buccola, Law and Legislation in Municipal 
Bankruptcy, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1301 (2017). 
16 Baird, Casey & Picker, supra note 1, at 1684. 
17 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012). 
18 Id. § 362(d)(adequate protection); § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (indubitable equivalent). 
19 Note that, as a descriptive matter, it is not clear that bankruptcy judges are to jointly maximize the 
value of security interests and property belonging formally to the estate. If the debtor cannot adequately 
protect the value of the creditor’s secured claim, the court is to allow repossession under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 362(d)—even where doing so fails to maximize joint value. As a descriptive matter, security interests 
might more accurately be imagined as constraints on the firm-value maximization norm. 
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Other items seem to come inside the partition selectively, by assertion of 
judicial authority. An example—about which the authors are ambivalent—is a 
cause of action belonging to one or more of a debtor’s creditors against a third 
party.20 This is the familiar problem of the third-party release.21 Its descriptive 
logic parallels that of the security interest. A judge who enjoins creditor litigation 
or compromises a creditor’s claim effectively brings that claim inside the 
partition—she asserts control of it—and should therefore seek to maximize its 
value alongside the debtor’s other assets. 
But should a bankruptcy court have control over creditors’ claims in the first 
place? The article acknowledges the case against third-party releases, especially 
where the claims to be released belong (outside bankruptcy) to only one or a 
minority of creditors.22 But the article also credits third-party releases with the 
capacity to achieve what it calls “global peace” where collective-action dynamics 
might otherwise overwhelm.23 And the authors point out that a rule of full 
compensation for those whose nonbankruptcy rights are compromised can, at 
least in principle, eliminate the prospect of strategic “commandeering.”24 On 
balance, at least on my reading, the authors seem to be moderate supporters of 
a third-party release power. 
But on what principle? How is the partition to be defined? What, in other 
words, distinguishes the assets that bankruptcy should “bring inside” the 
partition from those that should remain under the control of their 
nonbankruptcy owners? The article discusses “bankruptcy purposes,” but it 
could be more explicit about what those are. Indeed, if I have a complaint about 
the article, it is the lack of a limiting principle on the bankruptcy partition’s 
scope. The problem is this: any time one asset’s disposition could affect the value 
of an asset belonging to the debtor, there is, under the authors’ mode of 
analysis, at least a prima facie case for bringing the outside asset inside the 
partition. This is because there is always a chance that a Pareto-efficient 
trade—across the partition, so to speak—will fail to materialize if the court 
does not assert control over both assets concurrently. As soon as three parties 
 
20 See Baird, Casey & Picker, supra note 1, at 1687-90 (discussing third-party releases). 
21 Compare, e.g., Resorts Int’l, Inc. v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394, 1402 (9th Cir. 
1995) (holding that § 524(e) of the Code prohibits third-party releases), with MacArthur Co. v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 837 F.2d 89, 90 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming the bankruptcy court’s release of some of the 
debtor’s insurers from future litigation). 
22 Baird, Casey & Picker, supra note 1, at 1687-88. 
23 Id. at 1688. 
24 Id. In this sense, the article’s analysis of third-party releases looks much like its analysis of the 
security interest. Cf. id. at 1684 (“[T]he requirement that the secured creditor be given the indubitable 
equivalent of its collateral ensures that the partition is not shifted simply to give general creditors value that 
they could not enjoy outside of bankruptcy.”). Indeed, compensation might be a constitutional requirement 
under the Takings Clause. Cf. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601-02 (1935) 
(holding that mortgagee’s interest is property interest within the meaning of the Takings Clause). 
2019] The Bankruptcy Firm 7 
are involved, there is always a collective-action problem to be solved, always 
a “global peace” to be brokered. 
The authors are the people who taught me Coase, so I am sure they 
recognize my challenge as a restatement of the question underlying his 1937 
paper.25 Coase supplies the general answer, too: the limit on the partition’s 
scope is the price of knowledge. 
How, in particular, does this limit manifest? As the authors point out, the act 
of bringing an asset inside the partition will have a redistributive tinge and so 
will provoke strategic reaction unless the person whose control rights are to be 
nullified is fully compensated26—hence the “indubitable equivalent” rule 
discussed above. But compensation requires an appraisal of the asset’s value. 
Valuing collateral on a lift-stay motion is hard enough, even with a number of 
market checks often being available. How much more appraisal should one wish 
for? I don’t know. But I do know that if one ignores the informational burden 
courts face in valuing assets and the error costs valuation generates, one cannot 
define an upper bound to the size of the bankruptcy firm. In this sense, the 
appropriate scope of the firm in bankruptcy is intimately bound up with, and 
can’t be separated from, the effectiveness of the information-forcing 
mechanisms at the bankruptcy judge’s disposal—the effectiveness of the rules 
used to “police the partition.” Other things being equal, the more effectively a 
judge can induce investors to reveal their private valuations, the more extensive 
her control rights should be. 
The Goldilocks maxim once again yields the optimal solution. The bankruptcy 
partition should be not too big and not too small. But what concretely does this 
entail? The place to start is with the firm that investors in fact constituted outside 
bankruptcy. Solvent firms, like the bankruptcy partition, exist to ameliorate 
opportunistic behavior endemic in disintegrated markets, and solvent firms, too, 
are limited in scope by information problems. Markets work, however imperfectly, 
to locate a balance. Control rights over most asset classes are easy to assign, even 
on a state-contingent basis, so the burden is on the one who wants to shift control 
rights in bankruptcy to show (1) why the bankruptcy decision process is apt to do a 
better job valuing the relevant asset class than the parties could do ex ante and (2), 
if bankruptcy is better at valuation, what kind of contracting failure would have 
prevented investors from replicating its decision process in flush times. 
My suggested approach to defining the partition points to a minimal 
bankruptcy regime because its logic applies with equal force to the secured 
 
25 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
26 The proceeds of a transfer avoided under §§ 544(b) or 548 are shared by all creditors of the 
debtor, not only the creditors entitled to avoid the transfer under state law. See Baird, Casey & Picker, 
supra note 1, at 1685 n.27. This asymmetry has long bothered commentators. See, e.g., Vincent S.J. 
Buccola, Beyond Insolvency, 62 KAN. L. REV. 1, 35 n.99 (2013). But the authors are probably right to 
say the sharing rule does rough justice in most cases. 
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creditor’s foreclosure rights. But let me conclude by proposing a principle, in 
need of future elaboration, that is roughly consistent with existing law. The 
bankruptcy partition should embrace two and only two kinds of assets—those 
that belong to the debtor outside bankruptcy and those that would belong to the 
debtor outside bankruptcy but for its financial distress. The first category is 
straightforward. The second category would include, for example, a secured 
lender’s foreclosure rights (which are activated only by default), as well as 
property transferred preferentially or fraudulently (which typically would not 
have been transferred but for financial distress). The third-party release power 
does not make the cut, however, because a bankruptcy court doesn’t sit to resolve 
all collective-action problems. The optimal amount of opportunism, in 
bankruptcy and out, is greater than zero. 
CONCLUSION 
The Bankruptcy Partition is framed around the claim that scholars spill too 
much ink on arguments about bankruptcy’s distributional rules. I doubt whether 
that case has been proved. If nothing else, investors’ distributional expectations 
affect their propensity to generate and disclose information about the debtor’s 
prospects, which must in turn influence the efficacy of the rules for “policing the 
partition.” But ultimately the article’s contribution, which is substantial, has 
nothing to do with its nominal thesis. Its contribution is to identify and provoke 
research on the interdependency of three functions of bankruptcy law—deciding 
which assets are subject to bankruptcy’s decision processes; preventing investors’ 
interests in other, outside assets from coloring bankruptcy decisionmaking; and 
distributing value among the investors. More can, should, and will be said about 
each function. A major lesson of this paper is that changing the settings on one 
function is bound to impact the performance of the others. 
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